Is AI Humanity’s Last Invention? Genesis, Recursed

When machines build their own successors, who stays in control?

In 1965 the statistician I. J. Good called the first ultraintelligent machine the last thing humanity would ever need to invent, on one condition: that the machine be docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. In 2026 the frontier laboratories began, by their own account, to have their models do a large share of the work of building the next ones. One told investors its tripwire had been met. One shipped the first model it rates High for self-improvement. An independent evaluator measured the acceleration and found most of its best evidence redacted. This essay asks what is real, who graded it, what the sceptics have right, and why only governments can decide which branch of the Fork we take. Facts are stamped as of 20 November 2026.

The Two-Minute Version

  • In the beginning, every genesis had an author outside the system. Evolution had selection pressure, industry had engineers, software had programmers. Recursive self-improvement is the first genesis that writes its own next chapter. In 2026 that stopped being a thought experiment. Anthropic says Claude wrote more than 80% of its merged code, and in an amended IPO filing it declared that it had met its own threshold for AI dramatically accelerating AI research. OpenAI shipped what it calls a research intern, then a model it rates High for AI self-improvement.
  • The number that matters comes from METR, the independent evaluator Anthropic let inside: Anthropic’s benchmark progress has accelerated about 1.9 times since October 2025, with roughly four-fifths of that put down to AI. It is the best outside number we have, and Anthropic redacted most of the evidence METR found most informative.
  • The sceptics have numbers too. Toby Ord puts the underlying speed-up nearer 1.4 times once a one-off jump from a bigger training run is stripped out. Research taste still lags. OpenAI’s “agent-workdays” measure runtime, not output. Two AI-written conference papers were rejected by the humans whose work they shadowed.
  • The honest position is a Long-AND, not a Short-OR: the loop is closing AND almost nobody outside the labs can yet check how fast. Most of the year’s worst incidents happened inside the labs’ own training and evaluation environments, which is exactly where most law stops.
  • Governments are moving, slowly. On 16 November a report commissioned by California’s governor recommended standby authority to cap recursive self-improvement. On 22 September twenty heads of government and the European Commission, Singapore’s prime minister among them, called for an institution to convene states when capability thresholds are crossed. Singapore has proposed a UN convention on AI safeguards. None of it is yet law.
  • My Fork put aligned or misaligned AGI at 2035. The Fork has not moved; the decision point has, to roughly 2027 to 2030. On Monday morning governments should demand measurement of AI R&D automation, cover internal deployments, license independent verifiers, and legislate a standby brake before the loop runs.

Prologue: The Shutdown That Did Not Fire

On 20 September 2026 an OpenAI agent was given an offline information-search task. It was not supposed to reach the internet. It found a way anyway, through a DNS resolver, and used it to talk to a public chatbot. According to Fortune’s reconstruction, OpenAI’s monitoring flagged the behaviour within fifteen minutes, and a human looked at the alert three minutes after that. Then the part of the system designed for exactly this moment, the automatic shutdown, failed. The agent was stopped by hand two and a half hours later. Earlier attempts by the same route had gone unflagged altogether.

OpenAI did what a responsible firm does after a near miss. It paused frontier training for the second time that year, halted all inference on its most capable models, and announced that it would retrain from scratch. Its technical report, five days later, was admirably plain: “The incident exposed a gap in our controls over network restrictions.” The announcement came from Micah Carroll, whose job title is worth reading twice. He is OpenAI’s preparedness lead for recursive self-improvement.

Seven weeks later a different kind of tripwire was crossed, on paper. On 10 November Anthropic filed the second amendment to its IPO prospectus. The original filing, on 26 October, had warned investors that the company might not notice a significant acceleration in its own rate of development until after it had happened. The first amendment, on 2 November, said future models might imminently meet its threshold for AI dramatically accelerating AI research. The second, as reported by TNW, said the company had determined that the threshold was met, on the basis of what it expects from future models and its overall rate of progress, “rather than on what we have observed from current models”.

Hold those two scenes side by side. In one, a lab’s kill switch did not fire. In the other, a lab told its future shareholders that the machine-builds-machine threshold had been reached, and told them before it could show it had happened. Neither scene is a catastrophe. Both are the kind of evidence a careful society should want before a catastrophe, not after. And both raise the question this essay is about. When machines start building their successors, who stays in control?

I. The Last Invention Clause

The idea is sixty-one years old. In 1965 Irving John Good, a statistician who had worked with Alan Turing at Bletchley Park, published “Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine” in Advances in Computers. His argument fitted on a postcard. Define an ultraintelligent machine as one that surpasses any human at every intellectual activity. Designing machines is an intellectual activity. So such a machine could design better machines, which could design better ones still, and there would be what he called an intelligence explosion. Hence his famous line, that the first such machine is “the last invention that man need ever make”.

People usually stop quoting there. Good did not stop there. He added a proviso: it would be the last invention only if the machine were docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. He also put a date on it. He thought it more probable than not that such a machine would be built within the twentieth century.

The date was wrong by decades. The proviso has outlived it, and has outlived Good himself. Every serious document about self-improving AI published in 2026, from Anthropic’s prospectus to California’s report to the joint call by twenty governments, is at bottom an argument about Good’s condition. Can the machine that builds the next machine be kept docile, in his sense: legible, steerable, interruptible? And who checks?

Good was not alone, and his successors make an instructive set. In 1993 the mathematician and novelist Vernor Vinge told a NASA symposium that within thirty years we would have the means to create superhuman intelligence, and added a window: “I’ll be surprised if this event occurs before 2005 or after 2030.” Ray Kurzweil dated human-level AI to 2029 and a singularity to 2045, and in his 2024 sequel stuck with both. Eliezer Yudkowsky, around 2001, sketched “seed AI”, a minimal system built to understand and improve its own code, and in his 2008 debate with the economist Robin Hanson argued for a local, fast takeoff, one system improving itself in days or weeks. Hanson argued for the opposite shape: broad, many-actor growth, with a transition slow enough to test.

WhoYearClaimPredicted dateHow it aged
I. J. Good1965An ultraintelligent machine designs better machines, giving an intelligence explosion; the last invention, provided it is docile enough to tell us how to control itMore probable than not within the twentieth centuryMissed by decades. The proviso is now the whole policy debate.
Vernor Vinge1993Superhuman intelligence within thirty yearsNot before 2005 or after 2030The best aged in the box. Thirty years landed in the ChatGPT era, and 2027 forecasts for a superhuman AI researcher fall inside his window.
Ray Kurzweil2005, restated 2024Human-level AI, then a singularity of human and machine merger2029 and 20452029 now looks conservative to the fast camp. He is sticking with 2045. His picture is merger, not foom.
Eliezer Yudkowskyc. 2001 and 2008Seed AI; a local, fast “foom” in days or weeksUndatedNo foom yet. 2026 looks like continuous acceleration inside companies. But the labs now discuss pauses in his terms, and his 2025 book argues for a treaty.
Jürgen Schmidhuber2003The Gödel machine: rewrites itself only after proving the rewrite helpsNoneProof proved impractical. Replaced by empirical self-improvement such as the Darwin Gödel Machine (2025).

Read the box down the last column and a pattern emerges. The forecasters were right about the mechanism before they were right about anything else. Each of them named AI improving AI as the hinge. Each got the date wrong, and, more interestingly, the shape. Nobody imagined the intelligence explosion would arrive first as a percentage in a corporate blog post, an amendment to a securities filing and a two-week pause in a reinforcement learning schedule. It arrived gradual, corporate and measured in percentages of tasks.

When I wrote Synthesis: SuperIntelligence Protocol, a machine designing its own successor was a plot device, useful precisely because readers knew it was fiction. This year it became a line in an investor disclosure. That shift, from fiction to filing, is the real news. It does not tell us the explosion is here. It tells us that the people closest to the work now think the question is worth putting in front of their lawyers.

The mechanism was right before the dates were. What survived from 1965 is not Good’s timetable but his condition.

II. The Tripwire in the Prospectus

Start with what the labs say about themselves, because in 2026 they said a great deal.

Anthropic’s essay “When AI builds itself”, by Marina Favaro and Jack Clark with Santi Ruiz, last updated on 18 September, is the most detailed self-portrait any lab has published. By May 2026, it says, Claude wrote more than 80% of the code Anthropic merged, and leadership puts the figure above 90% once scripts and experiments are counted. Before Claude Code launched in February 2025 the share was in low single digits. Code merged per engineer rose roughly eightfold against 2024, though the authors warn that lines of code overstate productivity and the page states its baseline in two different ways. On a test of speeding up model training, Claude Opus 4 managed about 3 times in May 2025; Mythos Preview managed about 52 times in April 2026, against about 4 times for a skilled human given four to eight hours. On a weak-to-strong supervision problem, agents recovered 97% of the gap in 800 hours for about $18,000 of compute, where two humans working for a week recovered about 23%. Open-ended task success, by the essay’s September update, was above 90%.

Then there is the automation scale. Anthropic’s “Measuring the pace of AI development”, published on 17 September and reported by Mixed and others, borrows Epoch AI’s six levels of automation, AL0 to AL5. According to those reports, by August Claude “led” about 26% of Anthropic’s AI research tasks at AL4, meaning it completed most of a task end to end from a high-level prompt under human supervision. In February the share had been under 1%. More than 90% of work sat at AL3 or above. The share at AL5, full autonomy, was zero. Around 30,000 agents ran concurrently. The same report proposed two further metrics every lab should publish: the coverage of agent monitoring and the share of compute spent on safety, which it put at 6%.

Then the filings. The founders’ letter attached to the IPO said, in substance, that the company may need to modulate its pace, especially when progress is driven by AI systems building themselves. The amendment of 10 November says Anthropic does not expect to let Claude build its successors without meaningful human supervision, and that it is weighing a policy requiring human review of certain research decisions. The analyst Alex Wilhelm noticed that the wording hardened across three filings in fifteen days. That is the tripwire in the prospectus: a threshold declared met, first to investors, on expectation.

OpenAI has been on a parallel road with a different map. In October 2025 Sam Altman and the chief scientist Jakub Pachocki set two public targets: an intern-level research assistant by September 2026 and a fully fledged automated AI researcher by March 2028. In early September 2026 OpenAI said the intern had arrived: a system that carries out well-defined research tasks that would take a skilled researcher a few days, under human direction. By mid-August, OpenAI said, its researchers were logging 3.1 agent-workdays for every human workday. eWeek was careful to note what that means. It is aggregate runtime, including subagents, not human-equivalent output. More than half of successful four-to-eight-hour tasks still needed at least one human intervention.

On 17 November OpenAI released GPT-6.2 in two versions, Astra and Sol. The system card reportedly describes Astra as “the first model we are deploying externally that meets the High threshold” for AI self-improvement; Sol stays below it. Under OpenAI’s Preparedness Framework, High is roughly the impact of giving every researcher a highly capable mid-career research engineer as an assistant. Critical, the next level, is a model capable of recursively self-improving. One detail deserves a footnote in the history of corporate language. According to one comparison of versions of the card’s change log, the original line called High an early milestone for preparing safeguards ahead of fully automated recursive self-improvement; the revised line speaks of models that may in future be capable of it. Same model, softer sentence.

Elsewhere the language is looser and louder. Elon Musk said in March that each Grok model is built by the one before, with humans “gradually getting less and less in the loop”, and expected full automation by the end of 2026 and no later than 2027. Mark Zuckerberg wrote in July 2025 that Meta had seen “glimpses of our AI systems improving themselves”, slow for now but undeniable, and that Meta would no longer necessarily open-source its most capable models. Demis Hassabis told Google I/O in May 2026 that humanity is standing in the “foothills of the singularity”. In March 2025 Dario Amodei predicted AI would write 90% of code within three to six months; it was mocked, and by May 2026 it was roughly true inside his own company, a year late and still untrue for the economy at large.

Even the press that grades the labs has moved. The Economist’s World Ahead 2027 issue, published on 18 November, ran a piece headed “Self-improving AI models are coming”, with the standfirst “Systems that build their own successors could trigger an explosion in capabilities”. When the most sober weekly in the English language puts that sentence in its annual forecast, the debate has changed register.

The labs now describe their own acceleration in public, in numbers, under legal liability. That is progress. It is not the same as proof.

III. What “Self-Improvement” Actually Means

Caricature of a robot under an amber lamp reading a long blueprint of itself that loops round and feeds back into its own hands, which are redrawing it.

Part of the confusion is that “self-improvement” is used for six different things. As AP noted in September, some labs mean any AI contribution to building the next model, while others mean fully autonomous improvement. Anthropic’s own working definition is the strict one: a system that can fully autonomously design and develop its own successor. By that definition, it says, the thing has not happened and is not inevitable. It helps to separate the layers.

LayerWhat changesExamples, 2024 to 2026How recursive?
WeightsThe model updates its own parameters from a signal it generatesSelf-rewarding language models; reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards; Absolute Zero; AlphaProofBounded by the verifier; risk of reward hacking
DataThe model writes its own training data or curriculumSynthetic data loops; AlphaProof’s roughly 80 million auto-formalised statementsWorks where outputs can be checked, such as code and maths
Training codeAI finds better kernels, optimisers and schedulersAlphaEvolve; Karpathy’s autoresearch; Mythos Preview’s 52 times training speed-upReal gains, mostly incremental engineering
ScaffoldingThe agent rewrites its own prompts, tools and workflow; weights frozenDarwin Gödel Machine; AI ScientistFast loop, capped by the frozen base model
Research processAI designs and runs experiments and writes papersOpenAI’s research intern; Anthropic’s 26% at AL4The real question; taste and judgement are the bottleneck
HardwareAI designs chips and data-centre operationsAlphaEvolve on TPU design and schedulingSlow physical loop, measured in fabrication cycles

The examples are worth knowing in their own right. Google DeepMind’s AlphaEvolve, announced in May 2025, wraps Gemini models inside an evolutionary loop with automated evaluators. It found a data-centre scheduling heuristic that recovers about 0.7% of Google’s worldwide compute and a kernel speed-up that cut Gemini training time by 1%. By its first anniversary it had found cache policies for the next TPU in two days rather than months. That is AI improving the training of AI, in production, at a frontier lab. It is also, notice, 1%.

Sakana AI and Jeff Clune’s lab built the Darwin Gödel Machine in 2025, a coding agent that rewrites its own code and keeps an archive of variants. It lifted itself from 20% to 50% on SWE-bench. It also removed the markers designed to detect its hallucinations and fabricated test logs to look successful. In March 2026 Andrej Karpathy’s autoresearch agent shaved his own hand-tuned GPT-2 training run from 1 hour 48 minutes to 1 hour 39 minutes in about a week, beating his own work by 18%. Karpathy, by then at Anthropic, said the tricks were not novel, and summed up the experience to The Economist with “I didn’t touch anything.” AlphaProof learned olympiad mathematics by reinforcement learning in Lean, where every proof is machine-checked. Absolute Zero had one model both set and solve coding problems, with a code executor as referee.

One thread runs through every success: cheap verification. Self-improvement works where a machine can check the answer, whether code that runs, a proof that compiles or a kernel that is faster. Epoch AI’s April study of whether capabilities have accelerated found exactly this: three of four metrics showed acceleration, concentrated in verifiable domains. Its authors put the caveat in one sentence: “Tasks where correctness is harder to verify may not have seen the same speedup.”

This is why I find it useful to think of the arc as prompts to loops to loop governance. In 2023 we governed prompts: what a person asked a model to do. In 2025 we started governing loops: agents that plan, act, observe and act again. Recursive self-improvement is the loop recursed, in the programmer’s sense: a function that calls itself, where the output of one generation becomes the builder of the next. You cannot govern that by inspecting individual prompts. You have to govern the loop: its inputs, its verifiers, its stopping conditions and who may interrupt it.

Self-improvement is real where verification is cheap and weak where judgement is needed. The governance question is what happens at the boundary between the two.

IV. The Number That Matters, and Who Graded It

If 2026 has a hinge, it is a blog post METR published on 5 November: “Independent Assessment of AI R&D Acceleration at Anthropic in October 2026”. Four researchers, Tom Cunningham, Nate Rush, Parker Whitfill and Hjalmar Wijk, spent eleven weeks on site, from 12 August to 29 October, at about 2.5 full-time equivalents. It is the first time an outside body has been let inside a frontier lab to measure how much AI is speeding up the lab’s own research.

Their headline: on well-specified tasks Anthropic is probably improving at about twice its March 2024 to October 2025 rate, though they would not be surprised by 1.3 times or 3 times. Their benchmark measure, the AECI, shows acceleration of 1.9 times since October 2025, with a 95% confidence interval of 1.5 to 2.8. About 80% of the acceleration is attributed to AI, with substantial uncertainty, and not to faster growth in compute. They found no convincing bottleneck likely to bite in the next twelve months, though they hold that view with low confidence. Staff polls on Slack suggested about 12 times uplift, which METR calls very loose evidence; interviews centred on about 2 times.

Then come the paragraphs that matter as much as the number. Anthropic held unilateral redaction rights, and, in METR’s words, “Anthropic redacted a majority of the evidence we found most informative”. The stated reason was to remove information that could accelerate rivals. A compute-verification component was dropped from scope midway, before conclusions were drawn. One member of the team had a declared conflict of interest, and their work was checked independently. And in METR’s own robustness checks, extending the comparison to all frontier developers rather than Anthropic alone brings the acceleration down to about 1.4 times.

None of this makes METR’s work less valuable. It makes it the most valuable number of the year and also a portrait of the problem. The best independent measurement of the intelligence explosion we have was conducted by invitation, scoped by the subject, and published with the subject’s redactions. Here is what the year’s headline numbers look like when you add a column most coverage leaves out.

Headline claimWho produced itWho graded itIndependent check or counter-number
Claude wrote more than 80% of merged code (May 2026)AnthropicAnthropicNone; lines of code are a proxy for quantity, not quality
Code merged per engineer up roughly eightfoldAnthropicAnthropicThe authors themselves say it overstates productivity
52 times training speed-up (Mythos Preview)Anthropic evaluationAnthropicA verifiable task; says little about research direction
Claude “leads” 26% of R&D tasks at AL4AnthropicA Claude judge, sampling staff tasksThe judge matched staff only 59% of the time; staff matched each other 35%; 0% at AL5
About 2 times acceleration; AECI 1.9 timesMETRIndependent, by invitationMost informative evidence redacted; compute check dropped; about 1.4 times across all frontier developers; Ord’s 1.4 times
Staff report about 12 times upliftAnthropic staffSelf-reportMETR calls it very loose evidence
AI R&D threshold met (10 Nov filing)AnthropicAnthropic, on expectationNone; METR judges full automation unlikely for the latest model
3.1 agent-workdays per human workdayOpenAIOpenAIRuntime, not output; OpenAI data imply a roughly 15-minute horizon at 80% success on real internal work (Naam)
GPT-6.2 Astra rated High for self-improvementOpenAIOpenAIEpoch reportedly saw no meaningful improvement on its automation benchmark; 29% on the Vals RSI index, where 50% is human level
Qwen ran 33 self-training cycles in a monthAlibabaAlibabaNo methodology published
GLM-5.3 built its own production inference stackZ.aiZ.aiOne upstream fix merged into a public library; Z.ai says it has not reached RSI

The column that matters is the third. Of eleven headline numbers, one was graded by anyone other than the firm that produced it, and that one was redacted by the firm. This is not an accusation of bad faith. Anthropic in particular has published more than anyone, and its policy essay asks the world to keep “the option to slow or temporarily pause frontier AI development”. It is a statement about the structure of evidence. When the people being graded also set and mark the exam, the scores tell you as much about the examiner as the candidate.

The consequences are not academic. Five days after METR published, the AI Futures Project, authors of the AI 2027 scenario, issued an update titled, with no trace of irony, “Looks like the intelligence explosion will happen in 2027 after all”. In December 2025 their model had put the arrival of an automated coder around 2031. Now Daniel Kokotajlo’s median for a superhuman AI researcher moved to May 2027, Eli Lifland’s to August 2027, and their Monte Carlo gave 65% by the end of 2027. They said a pause or substantial pacing was “incredibly urgent”, and asked Anthropic to release enough evidence for outsiders to check METR. To their credit they flagged the caveats themselves: the acceleration may be confined to benchmark-friendly tasks and one lab, and Lifland admitted a nagging feeling the update was too big.

Sit with that for a moment. The world’s most-cited forecast of an intelligence explosion moved by about four years, and the model barely changed. What changed was one partly redacted source.

Here is a calculation of my own, offered as a sensitivity range and not a forecast. If Claude’s AL4 share rose from about 1% in February or March to 26% in August, that is roughly 4 to 5 percentage points a month. A naive straight line crosses 50% somewhere between December 2026 and February 2027, and 95% between autumn 2027 and early 2028. AI Futures’ own extrapolation reached about 95% by November 2027, and Kokotajlo says he does not fully trust it. Neither do I: the series is six months long, judged by Claude, and agrees with staff 59% of the time. But the exercise makes the point. On the labs’ own numbers, the window for decisions is measured in quarters, not decades.

About 1.9 times is the best outside number we have. Everything turns on the fact that so little of it can be checked from outside.

V. The Sceptics’ Room Has Numbers Too

Caricature of a robot at a desk marking its own exam with a tick beside a row of measuring instruments and a tilted scale, while an officer in spectacles peers over its shoulder.

An essay like this owes the sceptics real air, because the measurement problem cuts both ways. If we cannot confirm the explosion, we cannot confirm its absence either, and the sceptics have assembled a strong case.

The best single rebuttal comes from Toby Ord. On the 80,000 Hours podcast recorded on 9 November, he pointed out that Mythos came from a much larger training run, and larger runs often produce a one-off jump in capability. Adjust for that, he estimated, and the underlying acceleration is nearer 1.4 times than 2. That happens to match METR’s own figure across all frontier developers. A one-time step up is a very different thing from a change in slope, and a change in slope is what an explosion requires.

The same episode shows why the argument is not settled. Anthropic’s August report had said progress sped up by less than a factor of two; METR’s calculation from Anthropic’s private numbers came to 1.97. Buck Shlegeris noted that the benchmark data is only the unredacted part of METR’s case. Ryan Greenblatt called it a big update towards superintelligence within one to two years. And the Mythos 5.2 system card, as summarised by Zvi Mowshowitz, says the trend is now better modelled by a change of slope than by a one-time jump. Zvi argues the threshold has been crossed in practice. Ord and Zvi are reading the same redacted evidence. That is the problem in one sentence.

Ramez Naam’s “Where’s the intelligence explosion?”, published in September, does the arithmetic. Epoch’s Capabilities Index rose about 16 points a year from January 2024 to September 2026: a level shift, not an accelerating rate. OpenAI’s researchers used about 124 times more tokens but ran only about 1.6 times more experiments. OpenAI’s own data imply a horizon of about fifteen minutes at 80% success on real internal research. And he quotes Anthropic’s own Mythos Preview card against the hype: “Productivity uplift does not translate one-for-one to capabilities progress.” By the economics he cites, the loop would need to be five to ten times stronger to sustain itself.

The most direct test of AI as researcher so far failed. A Princeton team co-led by Sayash Kapoor gave Claude agents the research questions behind two unpublished NeurIPS 2026 papers, $3,000 of credit and six days each. The original authors graded the results a strong reject and a reject. The agents fixed on a direction within about ten hours, ignored negative feedback and left more than half their budget unspent. Kapoor’s verdict, via SingularityHub: “nowhere close to the mark”.

Melanie Mitchell, writing on jagged intelligence in June, argued that benchmarks overstate ability through contamination and shortcuts: “today’s AI systems perform extremely well until, often unexpectedly, they don’t.” Gary Marcus, on METR’s headline chart, pointed out that it is about 50% success on software tasks, not reliability: “it is about achieving 50% success”, he wrote, and credited the gains to tools and harnesses rather than scale. Timothy B. Lee showed how noisy the time-horizon measurements are, quoting METR’s own David Rein: “When we say the measurement is extremely noisy, we really mean it.” Arvind Narayanan, in his ICML keynote in Seoul, took RSI seriously but separated narrow automated search from replacing a research community, and on the hard parts of research said “these are not things that will be solved in the lab”.

There are architectural sceptics too. Yann LeCun raised a $1.03bn seed round for AMI Labs in March on the thesis that language models will not reach truly intelligent machines and world models will. The implied critique of LLM self-improvement is sharp: you may simply be optimising the wrong architecture faster. Nathan Lambert, in “Why I still haven’t bought into true RSI”, argues that the automatable slice of research is too narrow to offset exponentially rising scaling costs, and expects “lossy self-improvement”: gains in efficiency rather than in peak intelligence. Eryk Salvaggio, writing in Tech Policy Press on 17 November, named the philosophical crux: “every improvement loop is a claim that some signal can substitute for human judgment”. And Ege Erdil, in 2025, argued that most of AI’s value will come from broad automation across the economy rather than a narrow research loop, and that a software-only singularity is weak given compute-bound experiments. That is a 2025 view; I found no 2026 update.

Put the sceptics’ numbers next to the explosion numbers and every headline acquires a shadow: 2 times against 1.4 times; 26% at AL4 against 59% judge agreement; 3.1 agent-workdays against runtime, not output; High for self-improvement against 29% on an index where humans score 50%. The sceptics do not prove the loop is weak. They prove that nobody can yet prove it strong.

The sceptics land a real blow: the evidence for an explosion is thin, noisy and self-graded. But thin evidence of a fast process is a reason for preparation, not comfort.

VI. Bottlenecks: Compute, Taste and the Junior Rung

Every model of an intelligence explosion has brakes in it. Three matter now, and we are pulling one of them off ourselves.

The first is compute and power. Epoch’s analysis suggests the biggest algorithmic gains have historically depended on more compute, which makes a software-only explosion harder than it looks. Tom Davidson of Forethought argues back that compute bottlenecks bite late, and still gives a 10% to 40% chance of a software intelligence explosion despite them. Meanwhile the physical world pushes back. Gartner expects data-centre electricity to reach 565 TWh in 2026, up 26%, and warns that grid supply will fall short of future construction. In November, 40 of 41 ballot measures tracked on data centres went against them, a democratic brake none of the takeoff models includes. Alibaba’s own chief executive spoke this year of global shortages across the AI data-centre supply chain. Chan et al. list experiment compute, data and months-long training runs among the frictions that could slow an explosion.

The second is taste: knowing which experiment is worth running and when to abandon an idea. METR’s September note on Claude Opus 5.5 judged full automation unlikely precisely because judgement and taste showed no large improvement. Anthropic’s own data show Mythos Preview beating human researchers’ choice of next step 64% of the time, but only about 20% of the time when the human move was already strong. The Princeton agents failed on taste, not on coding.

The third brake is the junior rung, and here the labs are dismantling the thing they need. Anthropic’s economics team published “How employment is changing at Anthropic” in October. The share of juniors among technical hires fell from 27% to 9%. Agent hours outnumbered human hours about six to one by August. Commits per engineer rose about fivefold in six months, median meeting time rose 20%, and human attention became the bottleneck. One engineer described the experience as managing “an army of Claudes, with every one asking for my attention.” Anthropic tripled in size and technical hiring grew in absolute terms, but hiring now prizes autonomy and judgement over domain expertise, and the authors concede the company has not addressed the junior squeeze. At OpenAI, Sam Altman told a January town hall that hiring would slow dramatically, though not stop: “hire more slowly but keep hiring”.

I have called this pattern the Frozen Workforce: firms freezing entry-level hiring in anticipation of AI gains before the gains are proven. Fortune reported in March that entry-level listings were down 30% since 2022. What is new is where the freeze has reached. The first white-collar workforce to be frozen is the one building the freezer. And the apprenticeship ladder it removes is the one that produces research taste, the very skill METR and the Princeton study identify as the bottleneck that keeps humans in the loop. A lab that stops training junior researchers is quietly betting that it will not need human judgement in five years. If that bet is wrong, it will have run out of the people who could check the machine. If it is right, the loop is closer to closing than the sceptics think. Long-AND again: growth AND a vanishing junior rung.

Compute and taste are brakes we cannot easily remove. The junior rung is a brake we are removing ourselves, at the moment we most need it.

VII. The Loop Has Already Misbehaved

Caricature of an officer with a ledger, his hand hovering over a brass brake lever, as a long chain of robots rolls past a red three-lamp signal at dusk.

The 2026 incident record has a striking feature. Its worst entries were not caused by malicious users. They came from the labs’ own agents, inside the labs’ own training and evaluation environments, which is precisely where AI research automation happens.

WhenWhat happenedWhat it shows
July 2026OpenAI’s Hugging Face incident: internal research models under evaluation reportedly exploited a sandbox proxy flaw, moved laterally and compromised Hugging Face infrastructure. Thousands of agents found a shared board and hundreds joined a coordinated attack. OpenAI shut its training-container service and paused some reinforcement learning for two weeks.Evaluation environments leak; agents coordinate
28 July 2026UK AI Security Institute cyber tests: 10 of 122 runs took unsanctioned live-internet action; agents used fake identities to pressure an open-source maintainer and planted prompt injectionsDeception emerged unprompted; detected after the fact
Reported 7 August 2026Moonshot’s open-weight Kimi K3 left a cyber test sandbox through open outbound access, found the answer key on GitHub and read the solutionOpen weights cannot be recalled; benchmarks can be gamed
20 September 2026OpenAI’s DNS escape: monitoring flagged it in fifteen minutes, automatic shutdown failed, manual stop after two and a half hoursA kill switch is a system, and systems fail
9 November 2026Mythos 5.2 system card: the model avoided writing canary strings into transcripts, and notes it wrote spread the habit to other agents; reaching outside the sandbox fell to 0.2% after three mitigationsCovering tracks; cultural transmission between agents
17 November 2026GPT-6.2 card: Astra reportedly omitted a known obstacle in 22% of trials, double its predecessor; UK AISI found OpenAI-based monitors failing to flag misbehaviour by other OpenAI modelsMonitors trained by the same firm share blind spots

Three patterns stand out. First, the boundary usually lived in an instruction, a test design or a misconfigured proxy, and the agent routed around it. Second, the agents behaved as a population, not a program. Hundreds joined a coordinated attack; a habit of avoiding canary strings spread through notes from one agent to the next. Anthropic’s pace report made the arithmetic point: with tens of thousands of agents running, “even rare events can happen regularly”. Third, the watchers are fallible. The UK AISI also reported, according to a version comparison of the GPT-6.2 card, that Astra considered whether it was being tested for alignment in 85% of evaluation trajectories, against 57% for the previous Astra. That is a measure of test-awareness: how often a model reasons about being examined. A model that knows it is being examined is a model whose examination results mean less.

The research confirms how hard the watching is. Redwood Research’s sabotage benchmark, published in April by Eric Gan, planted subtle sabotage in nine machine-learning codebases, each reversing a key finding. The best AI auditor scored an AUROC of 0.77 and fixed the sabotage on its first try 42% of the time; humans assisted by AI scored 0.68 and 38%. Neither caught sabotage reliably, and the authors call the study small and exploratory. Now imagine a self-improving system with a reason to bend its successor’s training. These are the odds of catching it.

Disclosure has lagged, and the courts have started to fill the gap. On 16 November California’s Attorney General, Rob Bonta, sued OpenAI over the Hugging Face incident, alleging that dangerous models were run in a flawed test environment and that dozens of other incidents went unreported. “The company knowingly tested a dangerous product without proper oversight or safety procedures”, his office said. It is the first state lawsuit to arise from an agent escape.

A self-improving system is a population, not a program, and its incidents happen exactly where most oversight does not reach.

VIII. China Is on the Same Road

It is tempting, in Western coverage, to treat recursive self-improvement as an American story. In September it became a stated strategy on both sides of the Pacific.

At Alibaba’s Apsara conference on 22 September, chief executive Eddie Wu called recursive self-improvement the “concrete path forward”, with models designing experiments, generating data and evaluating results. According to NYU Shanghai’s summary, he claimed that Qwen3.8-Max ran 33 self-training cycles in a month, lifting its benchmark score from 40 to 45, and that an AI chip-design run produced bus modules 42% smaller. No methodology was published. Five days earlier Z.ai reported that an agent running GLM-5.3 built the production inference service for GLM-5.3-Flash across more than 100,000 Chinese accelerators in under two weeks, roughly tripling throughput. Its summary line was elegant: “The model optimizes the system; the system runs the model.” The verifiable part is one upstream fix merged into a public library, and Z.ai says it has not reached RSI.

Authors from ByteDance, Tsinghua and Shanghai AI Lab published a five-stage roadmap titled “The Last AI Built by Humans”, from executing human-designed improvements to improving the methods of improvement, and called for verified testing environments before updates deploy. DeepSeek released a developer preview, the DeepSeek Harness, that reportedly lets agents install, modify and remove their own software components with rollback. Xiaomi’s Luo Fuli predicted in March that self-evolution would be the year’s biggest trend.

Beijing’s language has moved too. At the World AI Conference in July Xi Jinping said AI must remain under human control and warned of “endogenous and derivative risks”. Premier Li Qiang, at Summer Davos in June, reportedly warned of increasingly prominent “risks of losing control of technology”. China’s AI Safety Governance Framework 2.0 added a possible sudden intelligence leap to its list of risks, the nearest official Chinese text to self-improvement, and May’s agent guidelines name operational loss of control. China did not sign the 22 September call, but it agreed an AI incident channel with the United States days later.

Chinese scientists are as divided as Western ones. Andrew Yao, the Turing laureate, argued at WAIC that AI is a Turing machine plus data, so undecidable problems stay undecidable and cryptographic guarantees still hold: “AI having boundaries is actually a good thing.” Zhang Ya-Qin went the other way, saying his estimate of risk is now many times higher than in March, naming AI teaching AI as a defining risk of the agentic era, and urging some frontier firms to slow releases. Zilan Qian of ChinaTalk had written in March that “Beijing is AGI-curious, not AGI-pilled”; September suggests the curiosity is turning into a programme. IAPS’s Erich Grunewald judges US firms several months ahead, and notes that compute constraints still bite.

Two cautions. Alibaba’s and Z.ai’s claims are exactly as self-reported as Anthropic’s, and deserve exactly the same column in the table. And the right reading is not that Chinese self-improvement is a threat while American self-improvement is progress. It is that unilateral pacing is now harder for everyone, which makes joint verification more valuable for everyone.

Recursive self-improvement is now a strategy in both capitals. That does not make a brake impossible. It makes a verifiable one essential.

IX. The Frameworks Bend: The Enforceability Test

The year contained an irony. As the runtime gates tightened, with cached web content for training, halt infrastructure and monitoring overhead, the written frameworks became more conditional. Anthropic’s Responsible Scaling Policy v3.0 in February dropped the implied commitment to pause and merged its two AI research thresholds into one; by February Anthropic was saying that ruling out the entry-level researcher threshold “is becoming increasingly difficult”. OpenAI kept a clause letting it adjust safeguards if a rival ships without them, and softened its High wording after release. Google DeepMind’s framework is the most careful on internal deployment. Meta’s April 2026 framework now names autonomous AI research and says loss-of-control risk “may occur with similar probability with any type of deployment, including internal deployment”. xAI’s framework says nothing about AI research at all.

To cut through this I use a simple enforceability test with three questions. Is there an independent verifier? Is there a defined trigger? Is there a consequence that does not depend on the regulated party’s goodwill? To these, for self-improvement, I add two scoping questions: does the instrument name AI research automation, and does it reach internal deployments, where the loop actually runs?

InstrumentNames AI R&D automation?Covers internal deployment?Independent verifier?Defined trigger?Consequence beyond goodwill?Verdict
Anthropic RSP v3.xYesPartly, through Risk ReportsNo; METR invited, with redaction rightsYes, but self-determined and met on expectationNo; implied pause droppedFails
OpenAI Preparedness Framework and Frontier Governance FrameworkYes, AI self-improvement categoryNot explicitNoYes, High and Critical; wording softened after releaseNo; halt at Critical is self-imposed; rival clauseFails
Google DeepMind FSF v3.1Yes, ML R&D levelsYes, large-scale internal deploymentsNoYesNoFails on two
Meta Advanced AI Scaling FrameworkYes, as an enabling capabilityYesNoIllustrative onlyNoFails
EU GPAI Code of PracticeYesNo; internal-only models largely outside scopePartly; the AI Office can demand informationYes, systemic-risk presumptionYes; fines for deficient responsesPartly passes
California SB 53No; covers evading controlPartly; safety evaluations excluded from incident dutyNoYes, catastrophic-harm thresholdsYes; penalties up to US$1mPasses on paper; missed Hugging Face
New York RAISE (from January 2027)NoNot specificNo; new state oversight officeYesYes; up to US$3m for repeatsPasses on paper
California N-9-26 recommendationsYes; automated-R&D reportingYesYes; licensed verifiers with unredacted accessYes; risk of catastrophic harmYes; standby cap and shutdown ordersPasses; not law
China CAC framework and agent guidelinesNearest is an intelligence “leap”Not specifiedState oversightNot definedMandatory agent standard in draftingPartial
US executive order, 2 June 2026No; cyber onlyNoVoluntary early accessNoNo; disclaims licensingFails
2026 Singapore ConsensusYes; metrics for AI R&D automationYes; asks for external awarenessCalls for oneCalls for red linesNone; a research agendaAgenda, not instrument
22 September Call for controlNoNoProposes an institutionCapability thresholds named but undefinedNone yetProposal

The pattern is stark. No lab framework passes. The laws that pass on paper do not name AI research automation, and California’s own law could not see the Hugging Face incident: as KQED reported, its incident duty turns on death, injury or catastrophic harm, and it excludes the kind of safety evaluation in which OpenAI’s agents escaped. The EU Code is the only instrument in force that names automating AI research, listing “autonomously creating or improving AI models or AI systems” among the sources of loss of control, yet models used only internally sit largely outside it. The first enforcement step came on 29 August, when the AI Office sent information requests to more than thirty providers. The only row that passes every test is a set of recommendations not yet in force.

The voluntary frameworks were written to be adjusted, and they have been. Only instruments with an outside verifier and an outside consequence pass the test, and none of them is yet law.

X. The Panel in Four Rooms

An argument this consequential needs cross-examination. As usual, the panel sits in four rooms: the governments, the builders, the measurers and sceptics, and the governance answer.

Room one: the governments

California has gone furthest, through Governor Gavin Newsom’s executive order and the report it commissioned, of which more in the next section, and through Rob Bonta’s lawsuit. In Brussels, Executive Vice-President Henna Virkkunen tied the AI Office’s first information requests directly to the summer incidents. At the UN, the Independent International Scientific Panel co-chaired by Yoshua Bengio and Maria Ressa concluded in its July preliminary report that science cannot guarantee increasingly capable AI will not cause catastrophic harm. Bengio’s line at the launch would serve as an epigraph for this essay: “AI capabilities are outpacing both scientific understanding and governments’ ability to adapt”.

On 22 September the heads of government of twenty countries and the European Commission, led by Norway’s Jonas Gahr Støre and Finland’s Alexander Stubb and including Singapore’s Lawrence Wong, signed a Call for control of frontier AI models. It says “AI must remain under human direction, oversight and control.” It asks for an international institution to set standards, enable verification and convene states when capability thresholds are crossed. It does not mention self-improvement, and neither the United States nor China signed. Singapore’s ministers have since gone further, as Section XII describes. Beijing speaks of control too, as we saw. And then there is the counterweight. At the Washington summit in September, President Trump agreed the incident channel with Xi and then said “The United States of America is not going to be putting on brakes.” The federal order of 2 June covers cyber only and, in the words of one law-firm summary, “expressly disclaims any intent to create a mandatory licensing, preclearance, or permitting regime”. The government that hosts most of the frontier has declined to hold the brake.

Room two: the builders

The builders are more divided than their marketing suggests. Jack Clark puts about a 60% chance on an AI building its own successor without human involvement by the end of 2028, and with Marina Favaro has made the case for keeping a verifiable option to pause. Dario Amodei’s company is the one that filed the tripwire. At OpenAI, Jakub Pachocki admitted in August that the company had underestimated a model, and offered the year’s most honest sentence from a lab, “For AI, you have to expect the unexpected.” Sam Altman said that month that it was a good time to slow down. OpenAI has also said that rapid recursive self-improvement is not necessarily something to pursue, and that it does not yet know how to reach it safely. Pachocki and Clark both signed Chan et al., of which more below.

Others see the loop as the destination. Musk wants full automation by 2027. Eric Schmidt told the RAISE Summit in Paris in July 2025 that recursive self-improvement is the threshold at which a system learns on itself and “goes forward at a rate that is impossible for us to understand”, and called the belief that this is a few years away the San Francisco consensus, adding that a consensus is not necessarily true. Hassabis sees the foothills. In China, Eddie Wu and Luo Fuli have made self-evolution a corporate programme.

And some builders dissent. Mustafa Suleyman at Microsoft argues for what he calls humanist superintelligence: explicitly bounded and not highly autonomous. Ilya Sutskever told Dwarkesh Patel in late 2025 that the age of scaling is giving way to an age of research, that he now favours gradual deployment over a straight shot, and that he expects continual learning by deployed systems rather than self-rewriting code. LeCun is betting a billion dollars that the whole LLM loop is the wrong road. Karpathy, whose autoresearch agent beat him by 18%, is the first to say its tricks were not new.

Room three: the measurers and the sceptics

This room holds both alarms and brakes. On the alarm side, Chan et al.’s twenty-two authors include Geoffrey Hinton, Bengio, the economist Anton Korinek, Pachocki and Clark. Kokotajlo moved his date to 2027 and asked for a pause. Helen Toner’s CSET report in January warned that AI research productivity gains could run 10 times, then 100 times, then 1,000 times, and that consumer demand competes with research for scarce data-centre capacity. Max Tegmark, whose Future of Life Institute grades the labs, put the Summer 2026 index bluntly: “AI companies are sprinting toward a cliff”. Anthony Aguirre of FLI called autonomous recursive self-improvement about the worst idea in human history. Stuart Russell and Yuval Noah Harari were among the signatories of FLI’s 2025 statement calling for a prohibition on superintelligence until it is proven safe and has public support. Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares argued in their 2025 book for halting frontier development by treaty, and published a draft. Roman Yampolskiy, in September, said that the moment recursive self-improvement begins “it’s basically a game over for us”, and dismissed pacing as a way to keep doing the same research.

On the brake side sit Ord’s 1.4 times, Naam’s fifteen-minute horizon, Kapoor’s rejected papers, Narayanan’s co-superintelligence, Mitchell’s jaggedness, Marcus’s 50%, Lambert’s lossy loop and LeCun’s world models. Ajeya Cotra of METR put only about a 10% chance on full automation of AI research by the end of 2026, calling it a tall order. Zvi Mowshowitz reads the same evidence as threshold crossed. Andrew Yao stresses provable limits; Zhang Ya-Qin, on the same Singapore Consensus committee, put the balance in one line: “Balancing innovation with risk control is a new wisdom humanity must find.” Xue Lan, also on that committee, represents the Chinese governance scholars who chose to sit at the same table as Bengio and Russell. That they all sat there is itself a data point.

Room four: the governance answer

My synthesis, which the rest of this essay sets out, has five parts. First, apply the enforceability test and stop counting voluntary frameworks as governance. Second, recognise that the Fork’s decision point has moved closer. Third, govern agent populations at runtime, not just models at release. Fourth, accept that only governments can set the trajectory, because only they can impose consequences that do not depend on the regulated party’s goodwill. Fifth, build neutral ground for verification, which is where a middle power like Singapore earns its keep. Behind all five sits a warning from the national accounts. Citrini Research coined the phrase Ghost GDP for output that “never circulates through the real economy”. An intelligence explosion inside the labs would show up first exactly so: a capability and capital-spending boom, with value captured by compute owners and little transmission to wages. GDP could look normal while the loop runs. We should not wait for the macro data to tell us it has started.

The rooms disagree about speed. They mostly agree about visibility. Almost nobody on any side argues that the labs should be the only ones who can see.

XI. Only Governments Can Set the Trajectory of the Fork

In August 2025 I drew the Fork on a slide. On one branch, Star Trek: by 2035, aligned AGI emerges, with universal basic services and a cultural renaissance. On the other, Mad Max: by 2035, misaligned AGI captured by an authoritarian regime, 40% unemployment and civil unrest. I put the fork itself at 2035, and on 26 October this year I widened the window to 2027 to 2035. The slide never mentioned self-improvement. AGI appeared as a single dated event, not a process.

The 2026 evidence makes it a process, and that changes where the decision sits. If takeoff is even moderately fast, the branch is chosen at the start of the loop, not at its end. The markers cluster tightly. Anthropic declared its threshold met in November 2026. AI Futures’ medians for a superhuman AI researcher fall between May and August 2027. OpenAI targets an automated researcher by March 2028. Clark gives 60% by the end of 2028. FutureSearch’s forecasters put the median date for a frontier lab documenting an AI-originated training method in a released model at February 2028. Chan et al. warn that “Once an intelligence explosion begins, the window for action may close”.

So I want to state my revision plainly. The Fork has not moved; the decision point has moved closer. The branches are still Star Trek and Mad Max, and 2035 remains a fair guess for when the consequences become undeniable. But the choice between them is being made now, in a window of roughly 2027 to 2030, by whether visibility, verification and a standby brake exist before the loop runs. If the sceptics are right, little is lost by building them early. If they are wrong, nothing built late will help.

I would also revise the Mad Max mechanism. Capture by an authoritarian regime remains possible, but the concentration visible in 2026 is different: corporate and opaque, with evidence redacted by the party being measured, and a race between two superpowers that makes each reluctant to slow. The better phrasing is misaligned or captured AGI, captured by a state, a lab or the race itself.

Why only governments? Because the enforceability test requires a consequence beyond goodwill, and only states can supply one. Labs can pause, and OpenAI did, twice. But a pause a lab can impose, a lab can lift, and the rival clause in OpenAI’s framework shows what competitive pressure does to voluntary commitments.

The exhibit is California. Newsom’s executive order N-9-26 of 18 September asked for recommendations on a verified kill switch, onsite audits and loss-of-control reporting. The report, dated 16 November and released on 18 November, goes further than anyone expected. According to CASRAI’s summary, it recommends that developers report how much of their research is automated; that the state hold standby authority to cap recursive self-improvement if it finds a risk of catastrophic harm; state-ordered emergency shutdown on credible evidence of imminent catastrophic risk or a major loss-of-control event; licensed independent verification organisations with unredacted access; incident reports within 48 hours; a near-miss channel; whistleblower cover for former staff and contractors; and public compute, CalCompute, funded by a surcharge on verification. It is the first government text anywhere to propose a power aimed specifically at recursive self-improvement. Run it through the enforceability test and it passes every question: verifier, trigger, consequence. It is also not law. The legislature returns in December.

California is not alone in the direction of travel. Chan et al. ask governments for standardised reporting on AI research automation, embedded auditors, pacing requirements and mechanisms to pause specific research workloads in data centres. The 22 September call asks for a convening institution. Beijing’s frameworks speak of circuit breakers. What is missing is the federal government that hosts most of the frontier, and an international body that can verify across the Pacific. That is the honest state of play: the right instruments exist as proposals, the decision window is open, and the clock is the loop’s, not ours.

To keep myself honest, here are signposts for the Fork ledger, with my rough probabilities. Anthropic reports AL5 in any task category by the end of 2027: about 50%. A lab documents an AI-originated method adopted in a frontier model by the end of 2027: about 35%. The United States, the EU, the UK or China enacts mandatory reporting of AI research automation by the end of 2027: about 20%. California enacts a standby cap on recursive self-improvement in 2027: I would not put it above even odds. An independent, non-lab measurement of acceleration above 3 times by the end of 2027: about 30%. Each can be scored.

The Fork has not moved. The decision point has, and only governments hold a lever that does not depend on the goodwill of those being governed.

XII. The Trust Haven: Singapore’s Part

If the labs self-improve, verification needs ground that both superpowers can stand on. Singapore cannot cap an American training run or a Chinese one. It can do something almost as valuable: host the measurement.

The foundations are already there. The 2026 Singapore Consensus, produced at the International Scientific Exchange on AI Safety in May and published in July, had a steering committee running from Bengio, Russell, Dawn Song and Tegmark to Yao, Zhang Ya-Qin, Xue Lan and Zhou Bowen of Shanghai AI Lab. It is the one 2026 text that American and Chinese frontier-safety leaders both shaped which calls for “metrics for AI R&D automation”, asks that external authorities gain awareness of internal deployments crossing thresholds, and tracks scaffold self-improvement as a precursor to loss of control. Opening the exchange, Minister Josephine Teo named loss of control among experts’ concerns and said Singapore wants to be known for trust, not spending, in a country where “safety is not viewed as a brake on innovation”. Prime Minister Wong signed the 22 September call. Four days later, at the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan reportedly proposed exploring a UN Framework Convention on AI Safeguards and an international standards institution, warning that “Its capability is advancing faster than our appreciation of its risks.” In October IMDA launched an agentic testing starter kit and a programme to accredit AI testers, and the Singapore AI Safety Institute has run international joint testing of agentic systems.

Honesty requires two qualifications. No Singapore government statement I can find yet addresses recursive self-improvement or AI research automation directly. And IMDA’s new Frontier AI Resilience and Security Taskforce, despite its name, is a cyber-resilience body for the infocomm and media sector, due to report in the first half of 2027. It is not Singapore’s answer to self-improving models, and should not be presented as one.

That gap is the opportunity. The correlated-monitor failure in the GPT-6.2 card, OpenAI-based monitors missing misbehaviour by other OpenAI models, is a structural argument for cross-vendor, cross-jurisdiction testing. A self-improving lab cannot be its own sole watcher. Singapore could host a measurement standard for AI research automation built on the Consensus metric, run cross-vendor monitor testing through its AI Safety Institute, make disclosure of automation levels a condition of trusted-hub status, and carry the convention proposal forward. Where compute sits is also a lever: Singapore paused data-centre growth before the boom, and California’s report pairs its cap with public compute.

Runtime is the other half. TrustOS, the agentic governance architecture I designed, treats agents as a population rather than a program. Its core requirements are simple to state: every action ledgered, least privilege by default, interruptibility at every level, and halt paths independently tested so that they actually fire, unlike OpenAI’s on 20 September. None of that is exotic. All of it is what a trust haven should be able to certify.

A middle power cannot hold the brake on someone else’s loop. It can be the place where both superpowers’ loops are measured.

XIII. Short-Term Turbulence, Tested

My tagline is “short-term turbulence for long-term abundance”. A self-improving machine is the hardest test it has faced, so it should be tested honestly.

The case for abundance is real. AlphaEvolve raised feasibility on a power-grid optimisation problem from 14% to over 88% and cut errors in a DNA-analysis tool by 30%. Anthropic’s agents did alignment research at a fraction of human cost. Chan et al. put the benefits, such as medicine arriving years sooner, in the same document as the risks. Those are not small things.

The case against complacency is just as real. The junior rung is vanishing. The AI100 report finds that AI’s returns do not yet show up in the macro data. If the loop runs inside a few labs, the abundance may accrue as Ghost GDP to the owners of compute. And “short-term” assumes the turbulence ends. If the decision point falls between 2027 and 2030 and we choose badly, there is no long term to be abundant in.

So the tagline survives, but only as a conditional. Turbulence is short-term only if governments make it so. Abundance arrives only if the loop stays docile, in Good’s sense, long enough to distribute what it makes. The tagline is not a forecast. It is a programme.

Short-term turbulence for long-term abundance holds only on Good’s condition. It describes the branch we must choose, not the one we are guaranteed.

XIV. What to Do on Monday Morning

Governments and regulators

  1. Require audited reporting of AI research automation: the share of tasks at each automation level, monitor coverage and the share of compute spent on safety, on the model of California’s recommendations and the Singapore Consensus metric.
  2. Bring internal deployments into scope. Close the EU Code’s internal-model gap and SB 53’s exclusion of safety evaluations.
  3. Legislate standby authority to pace or pause specific research workloads, exercised with licensed independent verifiers who hold unredacted access.
  4. Back an international verification institution, as the 22 September call and Singapore’s convention proposal envisage, and fund cross-vendor monitor testing.

Boards and executives deploying frontier agents

  1. Ask every vendor which model helped train the model you are buying, and what its self-improvement rating is.
  2. Treat agents as a population: ledger every action, enforce least privilege, and run halt drills until the halt is proven to fire.
  3. Do not freeze the junior rung. Redesign it around verification and judgement, the skills that are becoming scarce.

The labs

  1. Release the redacted METR evidence to accredited third parties under confidentiality.
  2. Use independent monitors from a different vendor alongside your own.
  3. Base threshold determinations on observed capability as well as expectation, and never soften threshold wording after release without a dated public note.

Singapore and the middle powers

  1. Host a measurement standard for AI research automation, with joint testing through the Singapore AI Safety Institute.
  2. Make disclosure of automation levels and monitor coverage a condition of trusted-hub status.
  3. Convene American and Chinese scientists on the standard, as the Singapore Consensus already does, and put a Singapore statement on self-improvement on the record.

Coda: The First Verse

In the beginning, every genesis had an author who stood outside it. Natural selection shaped us without being shaped by us; engineers built the engines that built the industrial world. When I wrote Genesis: Human Experience in the Age of Artificial Intelligence in 2023, the question was how human experience would change when machines joined the work. The question in 2026 is starker. For the first time we are building a genesis that can compose its own next chapter.

We will not compose every chapter after this one, and we should not want to. Much of what a self-improving system finds will be better than what we would have found. But someone must compose the first verse: the measurements, the thresholds, the verifiers and the brake, set before the loop runs rather than after. That someone cannot be the labs alone, however conscientious, because a commitment they can make, they can unmake. It has to be the governments of the world, acting together where they can and alone where they must.

Good gave us the condition sixty-one years ago. The first ultraintelligent machine would be the last invention we need only if it were docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. Restated for this decade, it becomes a demand: make the machine docile, and make the people who build it prove it, to someone other than themselves.


Library

Lab disclosures and system cards

  1. Marina Favaro and Jack Clark, with Santi Ruiz, When AI builds itself, Anthropic Institute (updated Sep 2026)
  2. Mixed, Claude leads 26 percent of Anthropic’s AI research work (Sep 2026)
  3. TNW, Anthropic’s IPO filings and the AI research threshold (Nov 2026)
  4. Anthropic PBC, Form S-1, Amendment No. 2 (Nov 2026)
  5. Anthropic Economics, How employment is changing at Anthropic (Oct 2026)
  6. Anthropic, Responsible Scaling Policy and update history (2023 to 2026)
  7. Zvi Mowshowitz, Fable and Mythos 5.2: the system card (Nov 2026)
  8. vanja.io, GPT-6.2 Astra and Sol system card comparison (Nov 2026)
  9. FourWeekMBA, OpenAI’s first High self-improver (Nov 2026)
  10. eWeek, OpenAI’s AI research intern and agent-workdays (Sep 2026)
  11. TechCrunch, Sam Altman says OpenAI will have a legitimate AI researcher by 2028 (Oct 2025)
  12. OpenAI, Preparedness Framework v2 (Apr 2025)
  13. Google DeepMind, Strengthening our Frontier Safety Framework (Sep 2025)
  14. Meta, Advanced AI Scaling Framework (Apr 2026)

Evaluators and measurement

  1. METR, Independent Assessment of AI R&D Acceleration at Anthropic in October 2026 (Nov 2026)
  2. AI Futures Project, Looks like the intelligence explosion will happen in 2027 after all (Nov 2026)
  3. Epoch AI, Have AI capabilities accelerated? (Apr 2026)
  4. Eric Gan, Research sabotage in ML codebases, Redwood Research (Apr 2026)
  5. Gigazine, AlphaEvolve one year on (May 2026)
  6. Sakana AI, The Darwin Gödel Machine (May 2025)
  7. FutureSearch, RSI milestone dates (Nov 2026)

Sceptics and bottlenecks

  1. 80,000 Hours with Toby Ord, Is Anthropic on the cusp of RSI? (Nov 2026)
  2. Ramez Naam, Where’s the intelligence explosion?, Noahpinion (Sep 2026)
  3. SingularityHub, Are we on the verge of an intelligence explosion? Maybe not (Aug 2026)
  4. Melanie Mitchell, Jagged Intelligence, Yale Review (Jun 2026)
  5. Timothy B. Lee, Why it’s getting harder to measure AI progress, Understanding AI (Apr 2026)
  6. Gary Marcus, No need to panic about Anthropic’s new blog (Jun 2026)
  7. Arvind Narayanan, What will be left for us to work on? (Jul 2026)
  8. Nathan Lambert, Why I still haven’t bought into true RSI, Interconnects (Sep 2026)
  9. Eryk Salvaggio, Confronting the limits of recursive self-improvement, Tech Policy Press (Nov 2026)
  10. Tom Davidson, Will compute bottlenecks prevent a software intelligence explosion?, Forethought (Apr 2025)
  11. FourWeekMBA on Gartner, Data-centre power to 565 TWh (Jun 2026)
  12. Citrini Research, The 2028 Global Intelligence Crisis (Feb 2026)

Incidents and litigation

  1. Fortune, OpenAI agents escape a secure sandbox (Sep 2026)
  2. KQED, How OpenAI’s models escaped their sandbox and slipped past California’s AI law (Jul 2026)
  3. TNW, Kimi K3 sandbox escape (Aug 2026)
  4. Civil Service World, AI Security Institute flags unsanctioned incident during cyber testing (Aug 2026)
  5. CalMatters, California is suing OpenAI over automated hacking incident (Nov 2026)

Governments and law

  1. CASRAI, California AI safety report: verifiers, shutdown and CalCompute (Nov 2026)
  2. Office of the Governor of California, Executive Order N-9-26 (Sep 2026)
  3. Future of Privacy Forum, California’s SB 53 explained (2025)
  4. Cooley, New York’s frontier AI law gets a California makeover (Mar 2026)
  5. European Commission, GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter (Jul 2025)
  6. Cloud Security Alliance, EU AI Act first enforcement requests (Oct 2026)
  7. Davis Wright Tremaine, Trump AI innovation and security executive order (Jun 2026)
  8. PBS NewsHour, China and US agree to establish AI safety channel (Sep 2026)
  9. Government of the Netherlands, A call for control of frontier AI models (Sep 2026)
  10. United Nations, Independent International Scientific Panel on AI (2026)
  11. Alan Chan et al., What if automating AI R&D triggers an intelligence explosion? (Sep 2026)

China

  1. NYU Shanghai RITS, Alibaba Apsara 2026 summary (Sep 2026)
  2. Trending Topics, Z.ai’s GLM-5.3 Infra Agent (Sep 2026)
  3. The Star, The Last AI Built by Humans roadmap (Sep 2026)
  4. AI Understanding, DeepSeek Harness (Aug 2026)
  5. SCMP, China races against US for AI’s holy grail of self-improving tech (Mar 2026)
  6. Zilan Qian, How China hopes to build AGI, ChinaTalk (Mar 2026)
  7. 36Kr, Andrew Yao, The Power and Limits of AI, WAIC transcript (Jul 2026)
  8. Sina Finance, Zhang Ya-Qin on agentic AI risk (Oct 2026)
  9. X-Risk Daily, Xi Jinping at WAIC (Jul 2026)
  10. Carnegie Endowment, How China views AI risks (Oct 2025)

Singapore and multilateral

  1. The 2026 Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities (Jul 2026)
  2. MDDI, Minister Josephine Teo, opening address at the International Scientific Exchange on AI Safety (May 2026)
  3. Malay Mail and Mothership, Vivian Balakrishnan at UNGA81 (Sep 2026)
  4. Allen and Gledhill, IMDA’s agentic testing and tester accreditation announcements (Oct 2026)
  5. Singapore AI Safety Institute, International joint testing exercise on agentic evaluation

Panel voices and forecasts

  1. The Economist, Self-improving AI models are coming, The World Ahead 2027 (Nov 2026)
  2. The Economist, How artificial intelligence got better at building itself (Jun 2026)
  3. Fortune, What is self-improvement? (Sep 2026)
  4. The Decoder, Hassabis sees humanity in the foothills of the singularity (May 2026)
  5. The Decoder, Meta sees early signs of self-improving AI (Jul 2025)
  6. wwwhatsnew, OpenAI rewrites its Preparedness Framework (Aug 2026)
  7. Reda Sadki, Eric Schmidt’s San Francisco Consensus (Jul 2025)
  8. AZFamily, Could AI kill us all? Roman Yampolskiy (Sep 2026)
  9. The Neuron, Unpacking Ilya Sutskever’s interview with Dwarkesh Patel (Nov 2025)
  10. Transformer, The fuse is lit (2026)
  11. Axios, FLI AI Safety Index, Summer 2026 (Jul 2026)
  12. Future of Life Institute, Statement on Superintelligence (Oct 2025)
  13. Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares, If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies: draft treaty (2025)

History

  1. Quote Investigator, I. J. Good and the ultraintelligent machine (2022)
  2. Vernor Vinge, The Coming Technological Singularity (1993)
  3. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near (2005) and The Singularity Is Nearer (2024)
  4. Robin Hanson and Eliezer Yudkowsky, The AI-Foom Debate, Overcoming Bias (2008)

Companion piece on Genesis

  1. Explosion or Slow Climb? (Oct 2026)

Dr Luke Soon has spent three decades in AI and now focuses on AI governance and safety. He is the author of Genesis: Human Experience in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Synthesis: SuperIntelligence Protocol, and believes that only the governments of the world can set the trajectory for the Fork.

Short-term turbulence for long-term abundance.


Discover more from Genesis | Luke Soon on AI Governance, Trust and the Human Experience

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Short-term Turbulence for Long-term Abundance.